The Peter A. Allard School of Law

Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications

Allard Faculty Publications

2012

Prospects for Scalability: Relationships and Uncertainty in
Responsive Regulation
Cristie Ford
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, ford@allard.ubc.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Citation Details
Cristie Ford, "Prospects for Scalability: Relationships and Uncertainty in Responsive Regulation"
([forthcoming in 2013]) 7 Reg & Governance 14.

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Allard Faculty Publications at Allard Research
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard
Research Commons.

Prospects for Scalability: Relationships and Uncertainty in Responsive
Regulation
Cristie Ford
ford@law.ubc.ca
Ian Ayres’s and John Braithwaite’s book, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the
Deregulation Debate (1992) was a significant step relative to the work that preceded
it, and simultaneously reflective and emblematic of a larger contemporaneous
shift. The book represents a convergence between rational choice / game theory
analysis, which was perhaps then at its apogée, and the more sociological account
being developed by people like John Braithwaite and Peter Grabosky
(Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). Mary Ann Glendon’s Rights Talk (1991) and
Robert Ellickson’s Order Without Law (1991) had both come out the year before.
David Osborne’s and Ted Gaebler’s book Reinventing Government had come out the
month before, in February 1992 – the same month that the Maastricht Treaty,
creating the European Union, was signed. All in 1992, Yugoslavia fell apart,
apartheid was voted away in South Africa, the UN held the Earth Summit in
Brazil and, in November, Bill Clinton was elected President of the United States.
These are significant markers on the regulatory timeline because many of the
prominent works, and the prominent contexts, that we refer to today – the Open
Method of Coordination in the EU, the Reinventing Government efforts of Al
Gore and Bill Clinton, significant efforts toward global environmental law and
regulation, even the novel extrajudicial concept of the Truth and Reconciliation
commission – had not yet occurred. This is to say nothing of the revolutions we
have seen since. The internet was in its infancy. The multiple preconditions to the
recent financial crisis – including widespread complex financial engineering in
general and consumer debt securitization in particular, and the extraordinary
growth in the over-the-counter derivatives market – were not yet in place.
This paper seeks to take the original 1992 version of responsive regulation theory,
as articulated by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite in their book of that name, on its
own terms. The significant insights Responsive Regulation gave us have transcended
the book’s time at least as much as those from any other contemporary model.
Consider the enforcement pyramid, the benign big gun, tripartism, and the way in
which a tit-for-tat regulatory stance is supported by both game theory and civic
republican sociological approaches. Responsive Regulation developed a principled
way for regulators to choose between punishment and persuasion, recognizing
that neither approach works all the time. Consider also the concepts of “multiple
selves” and multiple registers of action; the relationship that Responsive Regulation
describes between regulation and other forces, be they public interest groups
(PIGs) or other actors contributing to the “license to operate” (Gunningham et.
al. 2003); and above all the embrace of contestability and revisability. Responsive
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Regulation’s insistence on pragmatic, context-sensitive application and continual
evolution is an important commitment given the complexity and uncertainty that
characterizes so many regulatory environments today.
Responsive Regulation develops a theoretical model that is meant to apply to a broad
range of contexts. It makes a large claim, even while recognizing that the
significance of the theory can be assessed only “through praxis in concrete
institutional arenas” (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 99). In that spirit, our recent
shared experience of the financial crisis may illuminate aspects of Responsive
Regulation that might otherwise have gone unremarked. Twenty years on and with
the benefit of this hard experience, two aspects of Responsive Regulation are striking.
The first is the direct, personal relationship on which the regulatory interaction is
premised. The second is the boundedness and manageability of the regulatory
project. Regulators are understood to know what behaviors constitute compliance
and non-compliance, to be able to interpret accurately signals from industry, and
to be able to calibrate appropriate responses. At least in prudential regulation of
global financial institutions in the wake of the recent financial crisis (though surely
elsewhere too), neither the ongoing face-to-face relationship nor the boundedness
or knowability of the regulatory terrain can be taken for granted.
This brief essay seeks to open a preliminary conversation about Responsive
Regulation in terms of its scalability. It considers whether as a practical matter,
Responsive Regulation can be scaled up to more diffuse, multiparty, logistically
complex contexts, such as financial regulation. While the theory aspires to general
applicability, it is grounded in empirical work in a particular kind of regulatory
environment, meaning that it may be less applicable in others. As a matter of
representation, the essay asks whether by projecting the focal object, the
responsive relationship, outward, Responsive Regulation distorts our image of
regulation in other contexts. In doing so, the inquiry inevitably reflects back on
Responsive Regulation’s own home environment, where the question is whether
Responsive Regulation also oversimplifies the complexity and challenges inherent in
the interpersonal relationship itself. The essay closes by arguing that in order to
incorporate responsive regulation’s considerable discursive and relational benefits
into regulatory environments such as global financial regulation, it needs to be
buttressed by additional regulatory technologies.i
The Roots of Responsive Regulation
Responsive Regulation puts forward a personal, and interpersonally-based,
perspective. Some of the book’s deepest roots, on John Braithwaite’s side, are
with subject areas such as coal mine safety, or patient care in the nursing home
industry. Accounts and interview excerpts derived from these environments give
the book much of its narrative force. These are environments characterized by
direct, face-to-face interactions between regulators and regulated actors. The fact
that industry actors must be licensed ab initio generates an essentially finite and
knowable pool of participants. Regulated actors are also geographically
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embedded, in spaces such as coal mines and nursing homes, the physical
condition of which is one of the things regulators are concerned about. The way
to examine such institutions is to physically visit them. The context that orients
Responsive Regulation is the personal nexus between compliance officer, supervisor,
enforcement staffer, and management and workers.
In addition to being personal and face-to-face, responsive regulation is
interpersonal, meaning that the quality and nature of the human relationship
undergirding regulation is of primary concern. The enforcement and regulatory
pyramids are institutional features built outward from a series of human
interactions over time, not from organization-level design concerns. The
orientation toward the interpersonal has only increased over the last twenty years.
The conceptual link between the responsive regulatory ideal and John
Braithwaite’s restorative justice work (e.g., Braithwaite 1989), which is also rooted
in personal relationships (e.g., Braithwaite 2002), is increasingly strong and
central.
The interpersonal orientation makes responsive regulation a rich perspective in a
field, regulation, which tends sometimes to revolve around more theoretical or
structural accounts. The level of so-called mundane human engagement has great
positive and normative significance, of course. As behavioral psychologists and
others have forcefully demonstrated in the years since Responsive Regulation was
published, we ignore the interpersonal at our peril.ii The interpersonal orientation
is also the source of the book’s great dynamism and context-sensitivity. From it
flow its important insights around tailoring regulation to particular actors,
accessing situational knowledge, and permitting flexible regulation through the
mechanism of enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 101-132).
A focus on the interpersonal makes it possible for Responsive Regulation to envision
a specific new form of flexible regulation, distinct from both outright deregulation
and from the increasingly maladaptive command-and-control bureaucratic
technique that (conventional wisdom tells us) preceded the book.iii
This is not to say that Responsive Regulation is indifferent to more systemic
questions. The book’s civic republican commitments are clear throughout. The
book anticipates subsequent work on the value of incremental problem-solving as
a mechanism for regulatory policy-making.iv Ayres and Braithwaite envision an
incremental accretion of well-designed and participation-enhancing regulatory
moments – such as giving real powers to relevant PIGs within tripartite discursive
structures – ultimately to be constitutive of a republican political order that
emphasizes direct participation in the regulatory moment, often at a very local
level, in the service of citizen empowerment and a thicker, more engaging account
of citizenship (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 17-18).
In thinking about what Responsive Regulation can contribute to the financial
regulatory arena, the question may be the degree to which one of its essential
elements, the direct interpersonal relationship as a basis of knowledge and action,
is scalable to the kinds of contexts that concern us in financial regulation.
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Regulation and Scale
What is scalability as a functional matter? This essay uses the term scalability,
first, in the sense that computer systems designers use it: as a technical measure of
how well systems can handle increasing workload and data volume, either based
on existing resources or by applying cost-effective strategies for extending the
system’s capacity (Weinstock and Goodenough 2006). A provisional definition of
scalability in regulation would be that it is a measure of whether and how well a
regulatory strategy operates in environments characterized by greater levels of
logistical complexity, workload, and scope. Of course, regulation inevitably takes
place in a multi-scalar and trans-scalar manner, and both regulation and relevant
scale definitions shift with time and context (see, e.g., Osofsky 2009). Scale levels
also affect each other (Ostrom, 2009).
All regulatory environments are characterized by complexity at the level of
interpersonal relations – Responsive Regulation offers quite stylized depictions of
them, even in its “home contexts” – but certain fields have other things going on
besides. More complex, technical, or contingent regulatory contexts impose nontrivial loads on regulatory architecture. Some regulatory fields simply have to
engage with more, and more far-flung, regulatees than others. Some regulatees
operate across regulatory jurisdictions, national or otherwise. Some regulatees
produce more products, and more complex products, more quickly. Some
products are held to more technical or complicated regulatory standards than
others.
This essay describes scalability through an example from international prudential
regulation. This is by no means the only possible example of a logistically scaledup regulatory context. But at least in the context of international financial
regulation, the scope, volume, and logistical complexity of the regulatory task
(meaning, e.g., the dynamic and highly technical nature of the subject matter, the
“long tail” and uncertain nature of consequences, difficulties in developing
outcome indicators or assessing compliance) make things like tit-for-tat
engagement and compliance evaluations far more challenging than responsive
regulation imagines. Highly diffuse or decentralized environments, like some of
the transnational network variety, also increase complexity (Abbott and Snidal
2012). Scale is a function of a model, not the actors that implement it, though we
could also encounter separate, serious problems of disarticulation or lack of
coordination between actors at different scales (Abbott and Snidal 2012; Heimer
2011).
The concept of scalability assumes that there are different scales that are of
concern to us. This much seems clear, although we could define scale in terms of
any number of metrics including the geographic, organizational, technical, or
product-oriented.v Because the core operative mechanism in Responsive Regulation is
the direct, interpersonal relationship between regulator and regulated entity, the
relevant technical question is whether and how well responsive regulation
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functions when the relationships in question move from one-to-one, to many-tomany.vi The kind of scaling up we are concerned with is scaling up from a context
where an inspector is engaged in a direct relationship with an inspected party, in
relation to a bounded physical space, around a relatively straightforward set of
regulatory compliance criteria – to contexts characterized by multiparty,
attenuated, or disintermediated relationships, a larger and perhaps less clearly
delineated regulatory space (in terms of scope, but also in the move from
enforcement/compliance to prospective rulemaking), and a more logistically
complex or contested set of regulatory compliance criteria.
In addition to being a technical measure, scale is also a conceptual. In a classic
article from 25 years ago, Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1987) defined a
conception of scale in law, by drawing an analogy between cartography and law.
He claimed that “the relations law entertains with social reality are much similar
to those between maps and spatial reality. Indeed, laws are maps …” (de Sousa
Santos 1987, p. 282). Because maps cannot represent all features of the real world
with perfect accuracy or they would have to be the size and shape of the real
world, maps distort reality through three mechanisms: scale, projection, and
symbolisation. This essay is most concerned with the first two. vii Speaking
representationally, as de Sousa Santos does, scale is a function of size relative to
the phenomenon to be mapped. As scale increases, that is the model tries to
encompass a larger area, the representation of detail must decrease.viii Because
maps are “a miniaturized version of reality, map-making involves the filtering of
details, the selection of both meaningful details and relevant features” (de Sousa
Santos 1987, p. 283). Whether a map is useful for a particular purpose depends on
whether the details that have been selected are appropriate for those purposes.
De Sousa Santos describes projection in map-making as referring to the distortions
that have to be built in, in order to represent a round globe on a flat piece of
paper. Cartographers can choose different ways to distort the globe. They can
trade off overlarge poles and undersized equators, or choose to depict distance
accurately at the expense of depicting area accurately. Which compromises are
most acceptable will depend on the purpose to which the map is put. Crucially for
our purposes, projection and distortion also happen outward from a focal object
or concern. As de Sousa Santos (1987, p. 285) says, “each map, each historical
period or each cultural tradition of map-making has a centre, a fixed point, a
physic or symbolic space in a privileged position around which the diversity, the
direction, and the meaning of other spaces is organized”. Whether the distortion
of reality that inevitably accompanies cartography does or does not entail a
“distortion of truth”, as de Sousa Santos (1987, p. 282) puts it, is a function of the
means by which scale, projection, and symbolisation are deployed.
For de Sousa Santos, the hermeneutic tools of scale and projection are useful for
understanding law. Using examples from his empirical work around
“revolutionary legality” in Portugal, property rights in Brazil, and popular courts
in the Cape Verde Islands, de Sousa Santos claims that particular accounts are
only coherent at particular scales. Although different scale level accounts interact,
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and particular social events can amount simultaneously to “legal events” at more
than one scale level, the legal accounts created at the different levels – in terms of
motivations, actors, central issues – are not equivalent.
The same point can be made in financial regulation. At the small scale regulators
could be concerned with investigating a particular financial institution for
subprime mortgage fraud (Freiden 2004). This is the kind of factual scenario in
which the Responsive Regulation account makes intuitive sense, even if regulators are
not inspecting a physical plant. They are inspecting physical documents and
speaking to those involved in creating them. Moving to a higher scale, regulators
could be concerned with the various steps through which a defined group of
financial institutions in a particular country transformed those subprime
mortgages into triple-A rated securities, and marketed them. Moving to a still
higher scale, regulators are confronted with the relationships between the
marketing of those instruments and effects such as global systemic risk, system
effects, interconnectedness, and the magnitude and impact of the over-thecounter derivatives market (see, e.g., Schwarcz 2008; McCoy et. al. 2009).
Similarly, the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in summer 2010 produced, at
different scales, lawsuits by families of those killed on the well; questions about
safety in the oversight of deepwater drilling rigs; and extensive environmental
effects (Broder 2011).
Extrapolating from de Sousa Santos, we might say that some conceptual
constructs are defined (explicitly or implicitly) in terms of a particular scale, and
only come into focus at that scale. Examples would include ecosystem-based
environmental law, or the tragedy of the commons – a phenomenon that can only
affect those that have a commons in common. Certain phenomena – a the law of
large numbers in statistics, or herd immunity in epidemiology – are so contingent
on achieving a particular scale level that their necessary preconditions are not
present at other (in these examples, lower) levels. James Madison was making a
scale argument when he said that freedom from oppression required a republic of
a certain minimum size.ix Systemic risk, system effects, and groupthink also
depend to some degree on achieving a particular scale. Where they are present,
they exert a considerable effect. Models embedded within other scales, which
cannot “see” system effects, will miss an important feature of the regulatory
landscape.
Similarly, if the truth of an assertion depends on a scale precondition, then claims
that seem to make sense at one level may seem incoherent at another. Lawrence
Cunningham (2007) critiques the “rhetoric” of principles-based securities
regulation on this basis. He argues that individual statutory provisions may be
more rules-based or principles-based, but that the language is meaningless when
used to describe entire regulatory regimes (but see Ford 2010, p. 265).
Technologies and methods can also be tightly linked to a particular scale level.
Apprenticeship-based education systems require one-on-one mentoring, while
modern classroom education can occur in 500-seat lecture theatres. Absent some
boosting technology, apprenticeships are not as scalable as lectures.
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Closer to home (i.e., to Responsive Regulation), the same may apply to game
theoretic modelling. A tit-for-tat model relies on a particularly direct and
responsive regulator/regulated relationship. Each of two parties makes a single
move, which is followed immediately by the other party’s responding move. This
is a highly stylized representation of regulatory interactions in any environment –
an important point, though beyond this paper’s scope – but the point here is that
the consequential and signaling functions on which the model depends are even
harder to generate when one moves from a one-to-one relationship to more
complex, “noisier” environments. These would include one-to-many
relationships, many-to-many relationships, or contexts where one party takes
more than one move during its turn, and so cannot interpret exactly what
provoked the regulatory response it receives.
The various accounts generated through scale functions are neither operatively
nor normatively neutral. Precisely how the legal accounts are drawn at different
scale levels is deeply constitutive of the social event itself (de Sousa Santos 1987,
p. 288). Moreover, like the focal concern on a map, the central legal concerns will
ramify outward:
“conceptualisations, interpretive styles and
techniques as well as ideological configurations
dominant at the centre tend to be taken out of
their context in which they originate and exported
to (and imposed upon) the periphery. They are
then applied in the legal periphery with little
attention to local regulatory needs, since such
needs are always interpreted and satisfied from the
point of view of the centre.” (de Sousa Santos
1987, p. 292.)
Scale, then, is both quantitative and qualitative. Talking about the general
scalability of regulation is too vague to be helpful. We may be concerned simply
about whether a system is operationally scalable at all (and it may be that some
elements of some models are not). Yet we will also be concerned about whether
the model scales up, while preserving attributes we particularly care about – its
efficiency, stability, transparency, flexibility, responsiveness, or democratic
representativeness. Taking steps to boost the scalability of a particular aspect of a
model may negatively affect the scalability of other aspects. Assessing the “fit” of
a particular model in relation to the regulatory problem at hand requires that we
make normative choices and establish priorities, ex ante.
As Elinor Ostrom has identified, different functions are best accomplished at
different scales. In a world of finite resources, imperfect information, and selfinterested action, no single method can be ideally effective across all scales
(Ostrom 1990). Scale-inappropriate modeling will be at best ineffective, and at
worst deeply damaging.x If we are serious about regulatory effectiveness, there is
value in trying to understand at what scale particular models are oriented, what
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the implications may be for their broader effectiveness, and what we might be
able to do about it.
How would we describe the scale level at which the responsive regulatory account
is principally situated? In terms of projection, what kinds and degrees of distortions
might we confront as we move out from Responsive Regulation’s core
preoccupations? Notwithstanding Responsive Regulation’s broader republican
commitments, the face-to-face compliance moment is its touchstone. Following
on John Braithwaite’s earlier book on the subject (1987), the question of when to
punish and when to persuade is also this book’s central concern. As Ayres and
Braithwaite recognize (1992, p. 58), their method is about enforcement and
compliance, not prospective rule-making. To a degree that is quite unique in
regulation studies, the circumstances are within the range of what Abram Chayes
(1976) would have recognized as a fairly traditional conception of adjudication.
This impresses the entire account with a particular orientation toward optimizing
regulatory effectiveness in those moments. In de Sousa Santos’s terms, that
moment is the focal concern of the responsive regulatory map, and its
conceptualizations and techniques are exported to the broader context. What
Responsive Regulation offers, then, is a roadmap for how to navigate through
regulatory interactions in a world where the players are depicted as known or
knowable, the subject matter is understood to be discrete, and what is called for is
a rational decision making process that regulators can follow in determining when
to lean in on an industry actor, and when to ease off.
It must be said that we should consider whether even the “home environment”
that Responsive Regulation addresses is necessarily as simple as it seems, or as simple
as responsive regulation claims it to be. Leaving aside the behavioral psychological
advances alluded to above, which substantially complicate our understanding of
the interpersonal relationship, recent empirical work testing responsive regulation
as implemented also suggests considerable gaps between theory and practice
(Mascini and Van Wijk 2009; Nielsen and Parker 2009; Welsh 2009; also Etienne
2012). This short essay cannot engage with these challenges, which are beyond its
scope. The point here is that, even if we assume a high degree of congruence
between responsive regulatory theory and real life experience in the theory’s
home environments, we cannot assume that responsive regulation will
automatically scale upward into the highly fluid, mutable, and dynamic scale at
which global financial regulation operates. The example below seeks to illustrate
this point. The final section of the essay considers options that may permit the
nature of the knowledge generated in the responsive regulatory relationship scale
up, even if the relationships themselves do not.
Basel II as a scale problem for enforced self-regulation
Relative to the command-and-control literature that preceded it, responsive
regulation represents an intentional move toward a more sophisticated, multi-level
regulatory approach. Responsive regulation recognizes that a lot of information is
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best gathered in a decentralized, firm-level manner and that knowledge about the
particular risks associated with a particular line of business should also be drawn
upward to the regulatory level. Though Ayres and Braithwaite do not frame it in
these terms, one could think of the enforcement pyramid as a compliance-intoregulation scaling tool, designed to locate discrete regulatory interactions within a
broader conceptual matrix and to aggregate them into a comprehensive regulatory
stance. Tripartism, also, implicitly recognizes that there are interested parties
operating at the interstitial layer of “civil society” (as it then was called), who
could be brought into the regulatory conversation. The book’s account of partial
industry regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 133-157), that is, that
government can effectively delegate regulatory tasks to a firm’s competitors by
forcing unregulated firms to compete with regulated ones, seems like a coverageoriented scaling strategy, in the sense that it extends the effect of regulation
beyond the directly regulated parties. Responsive Regulation also explicitly notes that
both individuals and firms/corporations are capable of disaggregation into
“multiple selves” (p. 30-35) – a vivid recognition of scale variability along a wholly
different, actor-oriented parameter.
Note that, consistent with Responsive Regulation’s focal concern on
relationships, each of these ways of addressing scale is fundamentally relational in
orientation. To the degree that Responsive Regulation even implicitly speaks about
scale, it does so from the point of view of the interpersonal and relationshipbased priorities that animate it. Indeed, responsive regulation as described by
Ayres and Braithwaite in 1992 is optimized in terms of efficiency, reliability, and
regulatory credibility when operated at smaller scales.
To illustrate, let us describe the June 2004 Basel II Capital Accord (Basel II) as
analogous to enforced self-regulation in Responsive Regulation’s terms. I am not
saying the financial crisis was caused by Responsive Regulation, or saying that
Basel II was a faithful instantiation of enforced self-regulation. It was not. The
financial crisis was multifactorial and other significant problems, such as
regulatory gaps, played far larger roles. Nevertheless there is some value in using
the financial crisis analogically, to help foreground the ways in which any
regulatory approach is bound to a particular scale and ill-suited to environments
where its focal objects are not the operative drivers.
Responsive Regulation locates “enforced self-regulation” at the crucial intermediate
layer of the enforcement pyramid (p. 101-132). This is an arrangement under
which firms develop their own set of context-specific conduct rules, which are
then publicly ratified and capable of public enforcement. The Basel II Capital
Accords were this kind of arrangement. Basel II establishes high-level, outcomeoriented requirements around the amount of capital that financial institutions
need to maintain in reserve, and then devolves the process-based risk assessment
details to the institutions themselves. The greater risk a financial institution was
carrying, the greater its reserves had to be. In 2004, Basel II capital adequacy
formulae were also incorporated, to disastrous effect, into the United States
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Securities and Exchange Commission's Consolidated Supervised Entities program
(CSE Program), concerning capital requirements for leading broker-dealers.
Let us now consider the assumptions and core preoccupations of enforced selfregulation. Fundamental to responsive regulatory strategies such as enforced selfregulation is, first, the assumption that regulated actors (here, “firms”) are rational,
autonomous and coherent enough to know how they are conducting themselves
internally, and to behave in their own self-interest. Like other game theoretic
models, tit-for-tat would make no sense if a regulator did not have a rational
counterparty to deal with (Becker 1968). Second, enforced self-regulation assumes
a meaningful regulatory presence. The regulator must be in a position to credibly
verify firms’ conduct and to respond accordingly. It should hold in reserve a
“benign big gun” that it can be expected to deploy, predictably and with
justification, where circumstances warrant. For Responsive Regulation, the source
and the context of that knowledge is the direct, highly communicative,
interpersonal relationship between regulator and firm. Responsive Regulation
does not require that the regulator be in the best position to know all the details
of a firm’s business (quite the opposite), but it does require that the regulator
actually have knowledge about the firm, including perhaps its “stance” (Black and
Baldwin 2007). The regulator needs to be in a position to measure firms’ conduct
against broader regulatory standards. Third, Responsive Regulation is framed
around the notion that the regulator/firm relationship is the primary locus where
important things happen. This is the rationale behind the tripartism prescription.
Tripartism assumes that the main way to give voice and effect to other, civil
society priorities is to make them part of that conversation.
What actually took place around prudential regulation of global financial
institutions under Basel II (and the CSE Program) was quite different, and in a
sense can be understood as problems of scale. Finance today is global, electronic,
fast-moving, and based on esoteric knowledge in a way that pulls it away
significantly from regulation of physically embedded and static regulated actors.
The first assumption above – that firms are rational, autonomous, and coherent
enough to behave in their own self-interest – was disproved in part as a function
of scale. Firms’ capacity to know, internally, exactly what risks they were running
was severely limited by their heavy reliance on software to handle the
extraordinarily complex assets, products, and markets they were dealing with
(Schwarcz 2009). The software was flawed (Taleb 2007; Gerding 2009). Just as
problematically, through its design the software buried contestable assumptions
below the level of human judgment, so that even the firms themselves actually
knew less about the kinds of risks they were running (Gerding 2009; Bamberger
2010).
The second assumption above, that of a credible regulatory presence, was also
disproved in part as a function of scale. Revolving door arguments aside, the
recent financial crisis cannot be understood primarily in terms of interpersonal
relationships.xi In the prudential regulation environment, as a factual matter there
was simply not a bedrock of personal relationship or personal knowledge on
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which to build (Kingsford-Smith 2011). Among some key prudential regulators,
such as the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority, the relationship
between firm and regulator became severely attenuated as a function of size,
staffing, and diffuse priorities (FSA Internal Audit Division 2008; also Black 2010,
p. 18-19). While regulators recognized the need to pursue “the same PhD rocket
scientists the banks [were] chasing” (Hughes 2008), as a practical matter they
lacked the regulatory capacity to credibly verify bank capital adequacy. In the
marketing of increasingly risky products and the increasing leverage that financial
firms themselves took on, the reliance on private sector financial modelling was
amplified by the delegation of crucial decision-making, by regulators, to thosethat-modeled. Regulatory self-accounts relied increasingly on the fiction of the
self-disciplining efficient market (UK Financial Services Authority 2009). This was
a scale problem in the sense that the scale of banks’ resources and the scale of the
problem outmatched regulators’ resources. (Power and influence are more than
just scale problems, of course: Ford 2011).
There was also a structural scale problem that contributed: in the United States,
where the worst problems occurred, the Basel II structure was incorporated into
the CSE Program on a voluntary basis because no American regulator had the
authority to impose capital adequacy requirements on global shadow banks (SEC
2008, p. 81).xii Regulatory arbitrage between London and New York also played a
role (Turner Review 2009). These are problems of scale mismatch between the
national mandate of the regulator and the global scale of the issue. The result, in
responsive regulatory terms, was that there was no credible public regulatory
presence at all, and no benign big gun in the background.
Finally, the third assumption above – that the regulator/firm relationship was the
primary locus where important things happened – was also disproved in part as a
function of scale. Far more important in the run-up to the financial crisis were
fully unregulated nearby spaces, such as the over-the-counter derivatives market
and the players in it; and the industry-wide competitive effects that produced a
behavioral cascade toward excessive risk-taking. Focusing on the regulator/firm
relationship misapprehends the economic and collective scale at which problems
were building.
To the extent that Responsive Regulation is organized around the three assumptions
above, and especially on the presence of an interpersonal regulator-firm
relationship as a basis for knowledge, it is incapable of speaking to the
circumstances surrounding Basel II. Because interpersonal and knowledgegenerating relationships are at the centre of the enforced self-regulation
conceptual map, it would be a costly mistake – a distortion of truth, in de Sousa
Santos’s terms (1987, p. 282) – to apply the model upward through scales without
reflecting on whether it still adequately represented the most salient facts, and
whether it was still congruent with regulatory concerns and priorities that came
into view at a different scale. Making enforced self-regulation relevant and
meaningful at a wholly different scale requires that we find ways to scale the
model up, past the reach of interpersonal relationships.xiii Moreover, we will want
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to do so without losing whatever it is that we think is most essential about
responsive regulation itself. While distortions and trade-offs will be inevitable as
we move through scales, we can make choices about what we most care about
accurately projecting upward.
Where do we go from here? Responses
The precise kinds of relationships on which Responsive Regulation is founded
probably cannot be scaled upward without incurring excessive costs. They would
be if we committed to a direct supervisory relationship all the way up, through
national and even global financial regulation (e.g., Pan 2011), though such linear
scalability would be very costly. Another option would be a form of corporatist or
“club” government, in which important regulatory decisions were made in forums
where regulatory and industry elites interacted with each other, with only an
attenuated relationship to those they notionally represented. Financial institutions’
and governments’ mutual economic dependence already makes this a reality at the
global level (Gelpern 2011). This preserves the direct relationship, but at the cost
of transparency, incorporating local information, and representativeness and
accountability (to say nothing of Responsive Regulation’s more aspirational civic
republican aims). Instead, I would take a normative stance in favor of trying to
project upward the nature and source of information that responsive regulation
generates – incremental, contextual, experiential, and collaboratively generated.
There are two main options in trying to make responsive regulation function at
higher scales. The first is to reduce the demands imposed on the responsive
regulatory system, by limiting the scale, scope, or logistical complexity of the
environment in some way. Computer systems designers know that systems are
more scalable if they do less for each user. What, then, is the minimum that the
(responsive) regulatory system must do (in order to still be responsive)? Riskbased approaches, which try to allocate regulatory resources to the most high risk
contexts, may be helpful in this regard (e.g., Black 2005; but see Gunningham
2011, p. 9). We may also want to consider the selective use of prophylactic or
default rules (e.g., Dorf and Sabel 1998), for the purpose of containing complexity
and limiting explicit variability.xiv Bright line capital adequacy requirements are
such a tool, and form part of the new Basel III Accord in the forms of leverage
ratios, mandatory capital conservation buffers, and similar measures (Basel III).
Routinization and standardization can also be scaling mechanisms, because by
holding some elements stable they create a platform on which diverse approaches
can interact (Simon 2011). Ironically, it was in fact a standardized contract for
purchase and sale, the ISDA Master Agreement, which permitted the over-thecounter derivatives market to grow to the extent and in the diversity that it did
(Jomadar 2007). Where and how risk assessments, standardization, and
prophylactic rules are embedded is a value-laden choice. Additionally, as Annelise
Riles has observed in describing the “agency” of tools, forms and technique are
contested and highly consequential (2011, p. 229). Yet carefully applied, these
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techniques may play an important role in corralling the regulatory project within
manageable bounds.
The second option would be to try to boost responsive regulation’s capacity at
higher scales. We have fewer real-life examples to look to here, though scholars
have contributed proposals. For example, creating a centralized standard-setting
and information-processing clearinghouse to aggregate information and
coordinate more localized regulatory engagements could help transform smallscale, discrete regulatory moments into something more systemic (e.g., Dorf and
Sabel 1998, p. 287–89, 354–56). Institutionalized “learning loops” and the metaregulatory notion of “regulating self-regulation” are another possibility (Parker
2002). Automated information gathering and computerized analytical models are
surely part of this endeavor. Recognizing that the risks associated with
automation can be considerable (Gerding 2009; Bamberger 2010), scalability to
extremely complex environments would otherwise be beyond human capacity.
Consciously establishing or trying to tweak existing governance nodes is another
possibility, though we should be clear that there is nothing automatically
democratic or fair about nodal governance (Burris, Drahos, and Shearing 2005).
In trying to scale responsive regulation upward, we cannot assume that either its
dynamism or its representativeness will automatically flow upward. Elinor
Ostrom’s work is instructive here. She and her colleagues argue that workable
regulation must reflect the boundaries of the relevant epistemic communities, and
the problem in question. Efforts at scaling should pay attention to those
boundaries, and should ensure that local-level information is valued and that
agency relationships have some legitimacy (McGinnis and Ostrom 2008). Ayres’s
and Braithwaite’s role for PIGs in tripartism reflects the same intuitions, but
Responsive Regulation does not address exactly how PIGs will be constituted, and it
does not contemplate a public role in ensuring that all relevant voices are at the
table. What Ostrom (1990) envisions is much more intentionality in the design of
nested regulatory enterprises across scales for such functions as informationgathering, policy-making, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and
governance.
The trade-offs involved in scaling up Responsive Regulation are not unmitigated
tragedies. As de Sousa Santos points out, representations can actually be made
more useful if one includes and omits the right things as scale increases and detail
is lost (1987, p. 283-84). The techniques above could make the difference between
an effective regulatory process that builds on incremental engagements, and a
series of disjointed and non-aggregating enforcement interactions that
cumulatively do not a system make. The task is to identify the tools that can help
convert diffuse, face-to-face responsive regulatory interactions into something
both effective at a higher scale, and also reflective of Responsive Regulation’s own
normative commitments in favor of civic engagement.
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i

I am grateful to Carol Heimer for this phrasing.

ii

Although not the focus of this essay, this is another significant way in which our understanding of
regulation has evolved. When Responsive Regulation was published, Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky were still a full decade away from being awarded the Nobel Prize. Much behavioral psychology
research engages at the same interpersonal level that Responsive Regulation does, and it represents an
especially direct challenge to the book’s more rational-actor based elements, including to some degree titfor-tat enforcement and the regulatory pyramid. In a different vein, we also have greater insight now into
the degree to which organizational hierarchies and legal architectural features influence the
interpersonal/relational level at which Responsive Regulation is pitched.
iii

An interesting recent empirical study of law scholars’ increasing, and increasingly pejorative, use of the
term “command-and-control” is in Short (2012).
iv

See, e.g., Sparrow (2000); also the experimentalists, notably Dorf and Sabel (1998).

v

De Sousa Santos (1987, p. 287) restricts his depiction of scale in law to three scale levels described
geographically: local law, nation state law, and world legality. In other contexts, these three levels may
seem more arbitrary than helpful. Another aspect of scale – the temporal dimension – is beyond this
paper’s scope. See, e.g., McGinnis and Ostrom (2008).
vi

Scale as I am using it should be distinguished from the economic concept of “economies of scale”. My
question is not whether Responsive Regulation can enjoy increasing returns with scale (something I
would seriously doubt) but rather whether the things we value about Responsive Regulation can be
carried up through scale levels where the interpersonal relationship no longer pertains. On the distinction
between economies of scale and scalability, see Chuang (2001).
vii

Symbolisation, which de Sousa Santos (1987, p. 285) describes as “the representation of selected
features and details of reality in graphic symbols”, is less central to this discussion. The particular
metaphors in Responsive Regulation – the enforcement pyramid, the benign big gun, the tit-for-tat
relationship – are symbolisation.
viii

Cartographers, and de Sousa Santos, use scale terms in the opposite way to how computer systems
designers and some other academics use them. Cartography uses the term “large scale” to refer to more
local, high-detail maps that cover a smaller area, and “small scale” for more high-level, less detailed
maps. By contrast, computer systems designers and others speak of “scaling up” from “small scale”
environments to more complex or larger ones. See, e.g., note 20 in McGinnis & Ostrom, 2008. Although
the cartographic definition is more technically correct, I am using the computer science definition. It
comports better with colloquial understandings of the terms and better illustrates the concepts examined
here.
ix

See, e.g., Federalist No. 10 (Madison 2003, p. 78); also Federalist No. 55 (Madison 2003, p. 339).

x

See, e.g., Scott (1999).
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xi

This is not to dismiss those arguments; only to say that the primary mechanisms here were not directly
interpersonal in the way that, for example, bribery or improper influence would be. The mechanism was
not operating at the same level that Responsive Regulation would have been operating. It operated at the
institutional level.

xii

See also Ostrom (1990) on the need for congruence in terms of scale between regulatory mandate and
regulatory capacity.
xiii

John Braithwaite himself disagrees that this level of interpersonal distance is inevitable. He advocates
instead for more hands-on regulation, which would allow regulators to “kick the tyres” on financial
products. Braithwaite (2009).
xiv

I am not saying that rules are invariably more certain or predictable than more flexible processes.
Rigid rules may just force variability and discretion “underground”. Nevertheless there is still some
potential benefit in limiting the number of moving pieces with which a regulator must explicitly contend.
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